More or less: a model and empirical evidence on preferences for under and over-payment in trade-in transactions by Kim, J et al.
Journal of Marketing Research
Vol. XLVIII (February 2011), 157 –171
*Jungkeun Kim is Senior Lecturer in Marketing, Auckland University of
Technology, New Zealand (e-mail: jungkeun.kim@aut.ac.nz). Raghunath
Singh Rao is Assistant Professor of Marketing, McCombs School of Busi-
ness, University of Texas at Austin (e-mail: Raghunath.Rao@mccombs.
utexas.edu). Kyeongheui Kim is Assistant Professor of Marketing, Depart-
ment of Management, University of Toronto (e-mail: kkim@rotman.
utoronto.ca). Akshay R. Rao is General Mills Chair in Marketing, Carlson
School of Management, University of Minnesota (e-mail: arao@umn.edu).
The authors are indebted to Haipeng Chen, Ashwani Monga, Amnon Rap-
poport, Robert Wyer, Yi Xiang, Rami Zwick, and seminar audiences at
Northwestern University, the University of California at Riverside, and the
University of Texas at Austin and San Antonio for comments and sugges-
tions. Ziv Carmon served as associate editor of this article.
JUNGKEUN KIM, RAGHUNATH SINGH RAO, KYEONGHEUI KIM, and
AKSHAY R. RAO*
Trade-in transactions typically involve an exchange of an old, used
version for a new or newer version of the product. When consumers
trade in their used model for a new model, the firm faces the choice of
paying the consumer a relatively low price for the used model and
charging a commensurately low price for the new model or paying a
relatively high price for the used model and charging a commensurately
high price for the new model. The extant literature suggests that
consumers always prefer to be overpaid in trade-in transactions because
they disproportionately value the gain associated with the revenues from
the sale of the used version of the product. The authors draw from the
prospect theory value function to develop a simple analytical model that
identifies a condition under which this preference for overpayment is
reversed. Their model predicts that even when faced with economically
equivalent price formats, consumers prefer to be overpaid when the ratio
of the price of their used product to the price of the new product is low,
but when that ratio is high, the preference for overpayment is reversed.
They observe support for the predictions that emerge from the model in
laboratory experiments.
Keywords: trade-ins, behavioral decision theory, analytical models,
consumer behavior, pricing
More or Less: A Model and Empirical
Evidence on Preferences for Under- and
Overpayment in Trade-In Transactions
© 2011, American Marketing Association
ISSN: 0022-2437 (print), 1547-7193 (electronic) 157
In many purchase situations, consumers engage in trans-
actions that involve the purchase of a new model of a prod-
uct and the simultaneous sale of a previously owned version
of the product. In the case of consumer durables such as
automobiles, golf clubs, wristwatches, and exercise equip-
ment; nondurables such as men’s suits and athletic shoes;
and industrial products such as CT scanners, textile machin-
ery, and executive jets, such trade-in transactions are
becoming relatively commonplace. In effect, the acquisition
price of the new model is reduced by an amount equal to the
value of the used model.
Trade-ins are ubiquitous and represent a significant eco-
nomic activity. Approximately 40% of all new consumer
automobile purchases involve a trade-in (Morton, Zettel-
meyer, and Silva-Risso 2003). They are also becoming
increasingly common in business markets for products such
as supercomputers (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998). Further-
more, in developing countries, which have experienced an
increase in demand for new durables, trade-ins (often
referred to as “exchanges”) are popular (Jain 1993) for a
host of products ranging from watches to television sets.
Thus, in terms of sheer magnitude, trade-ins represent tens
of billions of dollars’ worth of economic activity.
In addition, trade-ins have attracted the attention of policy
makers and consumer watchdog groups for several reasons.
On the one hand, trade-in practices have raised concerns
about the generation of consumer confusion. For example,
in 2003, the attorney general of Illinois accused dealers of
engaging in trade-in practices that were “nightmarish chal-
lenges for consumers” because of the complexity associated
with the deal (Consumer Affairs 2003). Similarly, electronic
car buying guides often refer to trade-ins as tools that deal-
ers employ to “rip off” or “confuse” customers by inflating
the trade-in price and simultaneously overpricing other ele-
ments of the deal, such as the price of the new model, the
cost of the warranty, or the magnitude of the interest rate
(www.InsiderCarSecrets.com, www.edmunds.com). On the
other hand, at times, policy makers have used trade-ins to
spur the sale of desirable replacements, such as the sale of
new and environmentally friendly cars. For example, in
1995 and 1996, French provincial governments offered con-
sumers subsidies akin to trade-ins to scrap their used cars
for new ones (Adda and Cooper 2000). In the United States,
the recently concluded “Cash for Clunkers” program,
designed to stimulate consumer spending, indicates the effi-
cacy of such trade-in programs. Therefore, in light of the
apparent economic and public policy significance of the
issue, an understanding of the behavioral underpinnings of
the trade-in transaction is a topic worthy of serious analyti-
cal and empirical scrutiny.
There are several plausible reasons for the existence of
trade-in or joint transactions, rather than the two transac-
tions being treated as separate, individual trades. With trade-
ins, consumers can reduce their “hassle” costs because they
can sell their used models without engaging in costly adver-
tising, responding to telephone inquiries, providing repeated
demonstrations of the product, and so on. Moreover, the
analytical literature suggests that trade-ins improve the
firm’s ability to (1) remove older models of a product from
the marketplace to mitigate their cannibalizing impact on
sales of the new model (Levinthal and Purohit 1989), (2)
price discriminate (Van Ackere and Reyniers 1993), and (3)
mitigate information asymmetry problems regarding older
models (Rao, Narasimhan, and John 2009).
Our interest in the trade-in phenomenon is different. We
focus on whether the manner in which the firm frames the
trade-in transaction has an impact on the preference exhib-
ited by the consumer. We draw from an emerging “behav-
ioral” tradition, which relies on principles of prospect
theory and mental accounting, to address whether economi-
cally equivalent trade-in deals are psychologically more or
less palatable to the buyer (Purohit 1995; Zhu, Chen, and
Dasgupta 2008). Specifically, we address whether economi-
cally irrelevant differences in the pricing structure of the
trade-in transaction yield meaningful differences in con-
sumer preferences.
The extant wisdom in the marketing literature indicates
that, in general, consumers prefer to be “overpaid” for the
old model they want to sell, even if that overpayment results
in a commensurately higher price for the new model they
want to purchase (Purohit 1995; Zhu, Chen, and Dasgupta
2008). We develop an analytical model and offer empirical
evidence that identifies the conditions under which this
preference for overpayment may be reversed and consumers
will exhibit a preference for an “underpayment” for the
model they want to sell. Our prediction is that when the
ratio of the value of the old model to that of the new model
reaches a critical point, consumers’ preference for overpay-
ment on the old model reverses. That is, they would rather
be underpaid on the old model with a concomitant reduction
in the price of the new model when the ratio of the value of
the old model to that of the new model is higher than this
critical point. We empirically observe this preference rever-
sal in a series of experimental studies.
The contribution of our research is fourfold. First, consis-
tent with recent treatments of the topic, we demonstrate that
consumers are not indifferent between economically equiva-
lent alternatives but rather display a theoretically defensible
preference for over- and underpayments for their previously
owned models. Second, we offer a simple analytical model
as well as empirical evidence to support our claim. Third,
our findings are of potential practical significance for sell-
ers of durable products who want to frame the trade-in
transaction and to policy makers who want to foster trade-
ins for certain welfare-improving interventions. Fourth, our
study sheds new theoretical insights on the rapidly growing
field of behavioral pricing, specifically in the area of parti-
tioned prices. Prior research has argued that consumers
respond more favorably when they encounter prices that
have been partitioned into constituent elements (e.g., the
price of the product and shipping and handling fees) than
when separate pricing elements are combined (Chakravarti
et al. 2002; Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998). Our
inquiry on trade-ins focuses on transactions whose prices
are naturally partitioned into two elements: the price associ-
ated with the old model and the price associated with the
new model.
BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND MODEL
An important property of trade-in transactions relevant to
our theorizing is the availability of two pieces of price infor-
mation: one associated with the old or trade-in model and
one associated with the new model. Therefore, before we
turn to the theoretical argument that motivates our model
and empirical test, we briefly review relevant literature that
examines settings in which consumers encounter multiple
prices for a single purchase transaction, or the literature on
partitioned prices.
Partitioned Prices
The literature on partitioned prices (e.g., Morwitz, Green-
leaf, and Johnson 1998) demonstrates that when a product’s
total price can be partitioned into two separate elements
(e.g., the product’s price and shipping and handling),
because the magnitude of one salient constituent element
(the product’s price) is lower, demand may increase.
Chakravarti and colleagues (2002) extend the theory and
observe that, consistent with mental accounting principles,
when evaluating prices associated with multicomponent
bundles, consumers prefer partitioned prices. Furthermore,
they observe that the effects are moderated by the attention
paid to the price of the focal product. That is, “decision out-
comes vary with different splits of the same total bundle
price” (Chakravarti et al. 2002, p. 227, emphasis added).
Other studies in this area have highlighted the conse-
quences of partitioning. For example, Hamilton and Srivas-
tava (2008) find that in a bundled product, when the higher
consumption value component is priced higher, the overall
evaluation of the price increases. Cheema and Soman
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(2008) highlight the role of partitioning product quantities
and find that consumption is regulated (declines) when
products (e.g., chocolates) are partitioned into multiple units
compared with when they are aggregated.
In our study, a trade-in transaction can be thought of as a
bundled transaction with two components: a new model
being purchased and an old model being sold. The impor-
tant difference between trade-in transactions and the parti-
tioning of prices (or products) is that in trade-in transac-
tions, consumers purchase one product (in which case they
incur an expenditure and lose money) while selling another
(in which case a monetary benefit accrues to them and they
gain money), whereas in the partitioning of prices, both ele-
ments of prices represent expenditures. This distinction
allows for an analysis of how consumers might process the
prices associated with the trades and the development of
some theoretically testable predictions regarding the price
formats consumers would most prefer.
A Simple Model
We employ Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect
theory value function to separate the trade-in transaction
into two components. One component reflects the gain asso-
ciated with the revenue that accrues to the consumer from
selling the old model, and the other component reflects the
loss associated with the payment the consumer incurs when
purchasing the new model.
The prospect theory value function is characterized by
three properties (Chen and Rao 2002; Kahneman and Tver-
sky 1979; Thaler 1985). First, outcomes are coded sepa-
rately for gains and losses in comparison with some refer-
ence point (typically a person’s current state of wealth),
implying that (1) people respond to changes relative to the
reference point, not absolute states, and (2) the two out-
comes are additively separable. These two premises of the
first property are important for our model development.
Specifically, as Thaler (1999, p. 188) observes, the notion
that “costs are generally viewed as losses” has been rejected
(Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Thaler 1985). Losses and
gains are outcomes relative to a consumer’s current state of
wealth. Therefore, we need to ensure that respondents
behave in a manner consistent with our model’s first prem-
ise. With respect to the second premise, if the outcomes are
not separable and are combined into one outcome, con-
sumers will simply evaluate the overall arithmetic conse-
quence of the difference in the two outcomes. We empiri-
cally examine both these premises in a pretest associated
with Study 1 and in Study 2.
Second, a property of the value function is that it is S
shaped: concave for gains and convex for losses (i.e., v¢¢[x] <
0, x > 0; v¢¢[x] > 0, x < 0). This property reflects the psy-
chophysical principle of diminishing marginal sensitivity. 
Third, the response is steeper for losses than for gains
(i.e., v[x] < –v[–x], x > 0), reflecting the principle of loss
aversion, according to which the disutility associated with a
loss is greater than the utility associated with a gain of the
same magnitude. Using the prospect theory value function,
we first present the intuition that underlies the results we
obtain and then present a formal model from which the
results flow.
Model Intuition
Consider two trade-in settings. In one setting, the value
of the model to be traded in is low, and in a second setting,
it is high, relative to the value of the model being purchased.
First, consider the low relative value condition. For example,
the consumer may be trading in a used cell phone for a new
one. Then, we can compare preferences for two economi-
cally equivalent pricing formats. In one case, the vendor
might offer a trade-in deal comprising an allowance of $40
for the trade-in model (a gain relative to the status quo ante)
and a price of $250 for the new instrument (a loss relative to
the status quo ante). In another case, the vendor might offer
a trade-in deal comprising an allowance of $80 for the trade-
in model (a gain) and a price of $290 for the new instrument
(a loss). When comparing the two (economically equiva-
lent) options, consumers may not be indifferent. The lower
values associated with the gains ($40 and $80, which are the
prices associated with model to be traded in) are closer to
the origin, and because people are relatively sensitive to
changes close to the origin since the slope of the value func-
tion close to the origin is relatively steep, they should be
relatively sensitive to the difference in magnitudes of the
gains. Conversely, the higher values associated with the
losses (prices associated with the new model) are further
from the origin, and because the slope of the value function
far from the origin is relatively shallow, people should be
relatively insensitive to the difference in magnitudes of the
losses. Therefore, because the difference between the two
gains ($40 and $80) has a greater impact on value percep-
tions than the difference between the two losses ($250 and
$290), people should prefer the higher gain ($80) and be
less affected by the accompanying higher loss (Purohit
1995; Zhu, Chen, and Dasgupta 2008). Figure 1 presents
this intuition.
In the second setting, the value of the model to be traded
in is high relative to the value of the model being purchased.
For example, consider again a consumer trading in a used
cell phone. The vendor might offer several economically
equivalent trade-in deals: a trade-in allowance of $210 for
 
 
 
figure 1
VALUATION Of A TRADE-IN TRANSAcTION WHEN THE USED
MODEL’S PRIcE IS LOW RELATIVE TO THAT Of THE NEW
MODEL
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the trade-in model (a gain) and a price of $250 for the new
instrument (a loss) or a trade-in allowance of $250 for the
trade-in model (a gain) and a price of $290 for the new
instrument (a loss). Now, the values associated with the
gains (prices associated with the model being traded in) are
far from the origin, and people should be relatively insensi-
tive to changes in gains. The higher values associated with
the losses (prices of the new model) are also far from the
origin, and people should be relatively insensitive to
changes in losses as well. However, because the prices asso-
ciated with the new model are situated in the loss domain,
the sensitivity to losses may be greater because of loss aver-
sion. As a consequence, the preference for a relatively high
price for the trade-in model may be reversed, and people
may prefer a relatively low price on the new model (and the
accompanying low price for the trade-in model). This pref-
erence reversal is a consequence of the interplay of two
forces: the curvature of the value function, which yields dif-
ferences in slope close to and far from the origin, and the
relative strength of the loss aversion coefficient in the
domain of losses. Figure 2 presents this intuition. Next, we
develop a mathematical model that allows for a more formal
description of this interplay.
The Model
A trade-in transaction consists of the following four key
elements: acquisition (purchase) of a new model, trade-in
(sale) of a used model, the price associated with the new
model, and the receipt of a “trade-in allowance” for the used
model. We employ these elements in the construction of our
model and assume that (1) consumers evaluate each element
separately, (2) the value of each element enters additively
into the overall subjective valuation, (3) the quality of the
products is fixed and cannot be changed by either party (i.e.,
there are no moral hazard problems), (4) the valuation of
each element follows the principles of prospect theory’s
value function, and (5) individual consumers face uncer-
tainty about prices in the marketplace so that their current
state of wealth is the reference price. In other words, in the
trade-in transaction, the entire monetary receipt of the trade-
in offer is coded as a gain because monetary receipts are
desirable, while the entire monetary payout for the new item
is coded as a loss because monetary outflows are undesir-
able and aversive.1
We define the following model terms:
h = valuation of quality of a new model of the product;
m = valuation of quality of the used model being traded in;
pn = stand-alone price of a new model, offered during a trans-
action that does not involve any trade-ins;
pu = stand-alone price that a dealer will offer to pay for the
used model being traded in; and
pn > pu > 0.
As we discussed previously and will be evident subsequently,
the quality-related parameters are irrelevant for our deriva-
tions. We present them here for conceptual completeness.
The reference-dependent value function can be expressed
as follows (Kivetz 2003):
where g(0) = 0, g¢ > 0, g¢¢ < 0, g¢¢¢ ≥ 0, and l > 1.
All our results can be derived from the general functional
form given in Equation 1. Here, for expositional conven-
ience and to enable us to focus on the trade-off between loss
aversion and diminishing sensitivity, we use a simple and
tractable functional form that captures all the key properties
of the value function. Note that a functional form that
includes different curvatures in the domains of gains and
losses (i.e., xa under gains and xb under losses; Chen and
Rao 2002; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) is also amenable
to this analysis. However, as Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
empirically observe, a ª bthus, for mathematical tractabil-
ity, we employ the same exponent under losses and gains.2
Therefore, we consider the following:
where land 0 < a <1. Loss aversion is captured with 
l, and a captures the diminishing sensitivity of the value
function.
Mathematically, we can write the subjective value of a
trade-in transaction in which a retailer quotes a new model
price of pn and offers a trade-in allowance of pu for the used
model being traded in using Equation 2 as follows:
( ) ( ) ( )
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figure 2
VALUATION Of A TRADE-IN TRANSAcTION WHEN THE USED
MODEL’S PRIcE IS HIGH RELATIVE TO THAT Of THE NEW
MODEL
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1To the extent that a transaction can be decoupled into “get” (product
attributes and benefits) and “give” (monetary sacrifice) components, it is
essential for our model that monetary payments are deemed aversive (loss
inducing). People should prefer to pay less rather than more because pay-
ing is painful, and paying more is even more painful. Recent evidence in
consumer behavior (see Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008) and cogni-
tive neuroscience (see Knutson et al. 2007) is consistent with this premise.
2For formal derivations based on the general functional form in Equa-
tion 1, see Appendix B. For formal derivations based on a functional form
that incorporates different exponents in the domains of gains and losses,
see the Web Appendix at http://www.marketingpower.com/jmrfeb11.
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Suppose that the retailer quotes a price (pn + d) for a new
model and offers a price (pu + d) for a used model in a trade-
in transaction, where (–pu) < d < (pn – pu).3 Because (pn +
d) – (pu + d) = pn – pu, the retailer should be indifferent
between these two price formats.
However, from the perspective of the consumer engaging
in the trade-in, the transaction that involves prices (pn + d)
and (pu + d) yields a total subjective value of the following:
A comparison of Equations 3 and 4 indicates that the two
valuations are not necessarily the same, even though the
economic consequences to the consumer are the same. Next,
we turn to a derivation of a proposition and three corollaries
that flow from this observation. (Appendix A provides all
the proofs.)
Proposition
Our key proposition is intended to identify the conditions
under which consumers prefer an overpayment or an under-
payment on their trade-in option. To accomplish this deriva-
tion, we define two terms: pu/pn ∫ k represents the ratio of
the price of the used model to the new model and lies
between 0 and 1 by construction, and Q ∫ l1/a – 1, a trans-
formation of the loss aversion coefficient, which also lies
between 0 and 1 because l  1 and 0 < a< 1. This term cap-
tures the interplay between the curvature of the value func-
tion (a) and the loss aversion coefficient (lThe following
proposition shows that a consumer’s most preferred pricing
format in a trade-in transaction depends on k:
P1: The optimal deviation of pricing from stand-alone prices 
is d* = [(Q – k)/1 – Q]pn. This deviation is decreasing in 
k, positive for k < Q, and negative for k > Q. In other words,
as the ratio of the price of the trade-in model to the price 
of the new model increases, the consumer experiences a
preference reversal from desiring an overpayment on the
trade-in allowance to desiring an underpayment on the
trade-in allowance when evaluating two financially equiva-
lent transactions.
Proof: The consumer’s utility is maximized for a value of
d satisfying arg
d
max{[na – l(m)a] – [(l)(pn + d)a – (pu + 
d)a]}, implying d* = [(Q – k)/1 – Q]pn.
In other words, consumers prefer to be overpaid on the
model being traded in when the value of the used model is
relatively low compared with that of the new model, and
they prefer to be underpaid on the model being traded in
when the value of the used model is relatively high com-
pared with that of the new model. Figure 3 is a graphical
representation of this result, in which loss aversion (l)
appears on the horizontal axis and Q (the tipping point that
determines the reversal) appears on the vertical axis, for three
different levels of a. In this figure, a pair of (l, a) values
yield a unique Q, such that for k < Q, overpayment is pre-
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
4 0v p d p dt u n≡ − + + − +
= −[ ]
η λ µ λ
η λ µ
α α α α
α α
Product Transaction
1 244 344 − + − + ( )( ) ( )λ α αp d p dn u
Pricing Transaction
1 24444 344444
.
ferred, and vice versa. Figure 3 shows the regions for the
preference of over- and underpayment.
Another straightforward implication of P1 is that for k >
1 (i.e., when consumers are “trading down”—when the
value of the used item is higher than the new item being pur-
chased), d* < 0 (i.e., underpayments are always preferred;
for a formal proof, see Appendix A). We capture the intuition
underlying this result in the following simple example:
Imagine a consumer engaging in a trade-in transaction in
which she is selling an object worth $20,000 (she enjoys a
monetary gain) while buying an object worth $10,000 (she
suffers a monetary loss). The impact of underpayment on
$10,000 leading to a reduction in loss is substantially higher
than the impact of overpayment on $20,000 leading to an
increase in gain because of the relative proximity of $10,000
to the origin and because of loss aversion. Thus, when this
consumer is trading down, both diminishing sensitivity and
loss aversion yield a preference for an underpayment.
Next, we present three corollaries of this result. The first
two corollaries demonstrate that both loss aversion and
diminishing sensitivity acting together are necessary to
observe a reversal in preference from a preference for over-
payment to a preference for underpayment. In the third
corollary, we demonstrate that the cutoff point Q changes
with changes in the loss aversion coefficient l
Corollary 1: In the absence of loss aversion (l Æ1) and the
presence of diminishing sensitivity (a < 1), con-
sumers always prefer an overpaid trade-in
allowance to an underpaid trade-in allowance
between two financially equivalent transactions.
Figure 3 indicates this result. The cutoff point Q is
obtained by examining any (l, a) pair. For any value of a <
1 and l = 1, Q = 1. For underpayment, k must be greater
than Q, but because k < 1 while Q = 1, in this case, no
region exists in which underpayment is preferred.
Corollary 2: In the absence of diminishing sensitivity (a = 1)
and the presence of loss aversion (l > 1), among
financially equivalent transactions, consumers’
3This is simply to rule out the following cases: (pu + d) < 0 (i.e., the con-
sumer must pay for the trade-in model), and (pu + d) > pn, which rules out a
higher price for the used model relative to the new model.
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cHANGE IN THE cUTOff VALUE Q AS LOSS AVERSION
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most preferred transaction involves an underpaid
trade-in allowance.
Again, Figure 3 shows the intuition for this result. As we
move from lower to higher values of a, the region of over-
payment (k < Q) shrinks. In the limit, as a Æ1, the over-
payment region shrinks to zero. Figure 4 further illuminates
the intuition. In this graph, we plot the optimal allowance as
a function of k for different values of a, with the loss aver-
sion parameter fixed at 2.0. The point at which a line inter-
sects the x-axis determines the value of k above which
underpayments are preferred. As the sensitivity decreases
(i.e., a increases), the point at which the reversal occurs
becomes smaller, and in the limit, a Æ1, k = 0, which
implies that underpayments are preferred for the entire
range of k.
Together, Corollaries 1 and 2 demonstrate the fundamen-
tal trade-off that a consumer faces. Diminishing sensitivity
leads to a preference for an overpaid pricing format, while
loss aversion leads to a preference for an underpaid pricing
format. Intuitively, when the value of the used model is a
small fraction of the price of the new model, the extent to
which even a small addition to the gain from the sale of the
used model payment is pleasurable is greater than the extent
to which the same small increase to the loss from the pay-
ment made for the new model is aversive. In other words,
when the values associated with the gain are small, the
diminishing sensitivity effect dominates the loss aversion
effect, and therefore consumers prefer the overpayment
pricing format. Conversely, when the value of the used
model is a large proportion of the value of the new model, a
small reduction in the loss associated with the payment for
the new model is more valuable than a commensurate
decrease in the gain from the payment received from the
used model. In this case, the loss-aversion effect dominates
the diminishing sensitivity effect, and consumers prefer the
underpayment pricing format. In essence, these two corol-
laries highlight the opposing effects of loss aversion and
diminishing sensitivity and provide a rationale for why the
predicted reversal occurs. The tipping point for the pre-
dicted preference reversal is reflected in Q, and Corollary 3
shows how this tipping point Q changes with changes in l.
Corollary 3: For any given value of athe point Q that determines
the cutoff for preference reversal from overpayment
to underpayment on trade-in allowance is a function
of the loss aversion coefficient (l). Specifically, the
larger the loss aversion coefficient, the larger is the
range of k observed for consumers’ preferences for
underpayment in trade-in allowances. That is, the
higher the value of l, the lower is the value of k that
generates a negative d*.
Figure 3 reveals the intuition that underlies this result. If
we examine the graph for any a, as we move to the right
(increasing l), Q declines. In other words, for higher values
of the loss aversion parameter, the preference reversal is
obtained for lower values of k. This result becomes clearer
in Figure 5, in which we plot the optimal allowance as a
function of k for different values of l (1.5, 2.0, 2.5, and 3.0,
respectively) while keeping a fixed. The point at which a
line intersects the x-axis determines the value of k above
which underpayment will be preferred. As Figure 5 shows,
for higher values of l, the intersection occurs at a lower
value of x, indicating a larger range in which underpayment
is preferred. Next, we describe our empirical efforts to
assess support for our claims.
EMPIRICAL TESTING
All the studies we present employ an experimental
approach in which participants were exposed to stimuli for
a consumer durable available from a hypothetical store. The
scenario to which consumers were exposed described an
opportunity to exchange an existing used product for a new
one. At one store, the used model to be traded in was to
receive a relatively low price (e.g., $40) and the new
model’s sticker price was commensurately low (e.g., $250),
and at the other store, the used model to be traded in was to
receive a relatively high price (e.g., $80) and the new
model’s sticker price was commensurately high (e.g., $290).
The total cash outlay required of participants was identical
(e.g., $210) at both stores.
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Depending on the purpose of the study, we employed a
series of dependent variables designed to elicit store prefer-
ences. In addition, we measured theoretically justifiable
individual difference variables and manipulation checks. In
all, we report three principal studies. In the first, we assess
support for our foundational prediction that a preference
reversal will be observed depending on the ratio of the used
model trade-in price to the new model price. In the second
study, we confirm that this effect occurs only when the
transactions are coded separately; when the transactions are
combined, the effect disappears. In the third study, we
examine a prediction that emerges from Corollary 3,
according to which the magnitude of loss aversion should
have an impact on the preference reversal.
STUDY 1
The purpose of Study 1 is to test the proposition derived
in the preceding section, which we restate as a refutable pre-
diction here:
H1: When trading in a model whose value is a relatively small
fraction of the price of the new model being purchased, con-
sumers will prefer to be overpaid on the model they are
trading in while being overcharged by a commensurately
higher amount for the new model being purchased, relative
to an economically equivalent option that underpays on the
model being traded in and charges a commensurately lower
price for the new model. Conversely, when trading in a
model whose value is a relatively large fraction of the price
of the new model being purchased, consumers will prefer to
be underpaid on the model they are trading in while being
charged a commensurately lower amount for the new model
being purchased, relative to an economically equivalent
option that overpays on the model being traded in and
charged a commensurately higher price for the new model.
Recall that two important premises underlying our model
are that (1) cash outlays are coded as losses and cash
receipts are coded as gains, relative to a reference point (a
person’s current state of wealth), and (2) outcomes are addi-
tively separable. We assess the validity of the first premise
using a pretest here and the validity of the second premise
experimentally in Study 2.
Pretest
Fifty-two undergraduate students at a large U.S. univer-
sity participated in a short in-class survey. In one condition,
they were asked to imagine purchasing a digital camera out-
right, priced at $250, and in another condition, they were
asked to imagine trading in their old camera, for which they
would receive a trade-in value of $250. In each condition,
participants responded to two dependent measures designed
to elicit their perceptions regarding the dollar amount being
expended on the new camera or received for the trade-in (1 =
“gain compared with current status,” and 7 = “loss com-
pared with current status”). The pretest results confirm that
participants perceived the price paid on the new camera in
the outright purchase condition as a loss to a significantly
greater degree than the price received for the old camera in
the trade-in condition (4.35 versus 2.46; t(51) = 4.84, p <
.01). In other words, the money received for the trade-in
model is indeed viewed as a gain relative to the participant’s
current wealth state, while the purchase price of the new
product is viewed as a loss, relative to the participant’s cur-
rent wealth state. Thus, an essential assumption of our
model is tenable, which allows us to proceed with our
empirical inquiry.
Design
To examine empirically whether our foundational predic-
tion regarding the anticipated preference reversal would be
observed, our principal focus in Study 1 was on a manipula-
tion of the ratio of the price of the used model to the price
of the new model. We measured respondents’ preferences
for the two pricing formats, which we embedded in the
stimulus. Therefore, our first task was to design a stimulus
in which the ratio of the trade-in model’s price to the new
model’s price could be manipulated. In particular, we
wanted to employ prices of the trade-in model that were
either relatively low or relatively high, in comparison with
the price of the new model, while holding all other variables
constant.
To accomplish this task, we created four price combina-
tions for the stimulus product (cameras). In one price com-
bination (low ratio), we priced the trade-in model at $40 and
the new model at $250, and in the second, we priced the
trade-in model at $80 and the new model at $290. In the
third price combination (high ratio), we priced the trade-in
model at $210 and the new model at $250, and in the last
price combination, we priced the trade-in model at $250 and
the new model at $290. This set of price combinations rep-
resents the two levels of one factor in our experimental
design.4
We also manipulated a second factor. Here, we provided
additional reference price information about the trade-in
model, the new model, or both. Our reason for providing
this information was to ensure empirically that respondents
were indeed coding the trade-in amount as a gain (not as a
loss) and coding the price of the new model as a loss (not as
a gain), relative to some reference price. We accomplished
this manipulation by providing a suggested price for the
new model (e.g., “You know that the suggested price of this
camera is $320”) and/or the purchase price of the old model
(e.g., “which you had paid $100 [$300] for”). Note that the
reference price for the new model ($320) is always higher
than the actual selling price, allowing for the possibility of
the price of the new model to be coded as a gain (of +$70
when the price is $250 and +$30 when the price is $290)
and thus allowing for a fair test of whether participants were
coding the price of the new model as a loss. Moreover, and
for a similar reason, the reference price for the used model
is always higher than the trade-in price ($100 when the
trade-in price is either $40 or $80, and $300 when the trade-
in price is either $210 or $250), allowing for the possibility
of the receipt from the trade-in model to be coded as a loss
(of –$60 or –$20, when the trade-in prices are $40 and $80,
4Our choice of price stimuli approximately corresponds to the parameter
values l = 2.25 and a  .5. These values correspond approximately to the
mean of the values reported in the empirical studies of the value function
parameters. Although there is broad agreement about the estimates of
lsome of the best-known studies show substantial variation in the esti-
mates of a Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate a  .88Camerer and
Ho (1994) report a  .32, and Wu and Gonzalez (1996) report an estimate
close to .48. Our experiment implies a value of a closer to the mean of
these three studies. For further discussion on prospect theory parameteriza-
tions, see Neilson and Stowe (2002).
respectively, and –$90 and –$50, when the trade-in prices
are $210 and $250, respectively). We should not observe the
predictions of our model unless the participants code receipts
associated with the trade-in model as gains and the costs
associated with the new model’s price as losses.5 This pro-
cedure yielded a 2 (ratio of trade-in price to new model’s
price: low versus high) ¥ 3 (reference price information: for
used model, for new model, or for both) between-subjects
factorial design.
Participants and Stimuli
Fifty-five undergraduate students (approximately 50%
female) from a large U.S. university participated in the
study. We used a digital camera as the stimulus. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental cells
and read stimuli associated with that cell. For example,
respondents assigned to the low ratio and both reference
prices provided condition read the following scenario:
You go to some electronic stores to buy a particular
digital camera that you want (the PowerShot SX300).
You know that the suggested price of this camera is
$320.
Two electronic stores offer trade-ins for an old camera
(the EasyPhoto ER50), which you had paid $100 for.
One store, XX, offers you $40 on the trade-in for the
old camera (the EasyPhoto ER50) and quotes $250 as
the price of the new digital camera (the PowerShot
SX300).
The other store, YY, offers you $80 on the trade-in for
the old camera (the EasyPhoto ER50) and quotes $290
as the price of the new digital camera (the PowerShot
SX300).
In both stores, you need to pay $210 plus the old cam-
era in order to buy the new camera.
Participants assigned to the high-ratio conditions read a
similar scenario, though the trade-in allowances were dif-
ferent: $210 for store XX, and $250 for store YY.
After they read the scenarios, participants reported their
preferences for each store on a ten-point scale (–5 = “Buy-
ing at store XX is better than buying at store YY,” and +5 =
“Buying at store YY is better than buying at store XX,” with
no midpoint, to ensure that participants would be forced to
select one or the other option). Subsequently, this scale was
transformed to a 1–10 scale. After participants responded to
preference items and demographic measures, we debriefed,
thanked, and dismissed them.
Results
We predicted that the store employing the overpayment
strategy would be preferred in the low-ratio condition and
that the store employing the underpayment strategy would
be preferred in the high-ratio condition. Moreover, we
expected no main or interaction effects caused by the refer-
ence price information manipulation, because we expected
respondents to code trade-in receipts as a gain and the price
of the new model as a loss, relative to the status quo ante. A
2 ¥ 3 analysis of variance yielded a nonsignificant inter-
action between reference price information and the ratio of
prices (F(2, 49) < 1). The main effect of the presence of ref-
erence price information was also not significant (F(1, 49) =
2.02, p > .10). These results support our premise that trade-
in receipts are not coded as losses and the price of a new
model is not coded as a gain.
As predicted, we observed a significant main effect of the
ratio of the price of the trade-in model to that of the new
model (F(1, 49) = 5.72, p < .02). Participants preferred the
store with the overpayment pricing format when the ratio of
the trade-in model to the new model was low (M = 5.64)
relative to when the ratio of the trade-in model to the new
model was high (M = 4.20).
A Rival Explanation
A rival explanation for our results is that in the low-ratio
condition, the two trade-in prices ($40 and $80) are rela-
tively salient because they are noticeably different from the
retail prices associated with the relevant trades ($250 and
$290), while in the high-ratio condition, the trade-in prices
($210 and $250) are less salient because they are almost
indistinguishable from the retail prices associated with the
relevant trades ($250 and $290). Thus, in the high-ratio con-
dition, participants’ attention may have been focused on the
retail price to a relatively greater degree. To assess whether
this possibility accounts for our results, we conducted a
study (n = 31) at a large U.S. university.
Students participated in an in-class survey, during which
they were exposed to the low-ratio condition ($40/$250,
$80/$290) and were asked whether they attended to $40
price ($80 price) for the old camera more than $250 ($290)
for the new camera on a seven-point scale (1 = “I attended
to $40 [$80] price more,” and 7 = “I attended to $250 [$290]
price more”). In both the stores, the respondents’ attention
to the used camera’s price was not significantly different
from their attention to the new camera’s price (M40/250 =
4.26 versus 4 [neutral value]; t(30) = 1.137, p > .25; M80/290 =
4.03 versus 4 [neutral value]; t(30) = .105, p > .90). In addi-
tion, to reconfirm that respondents viewed payments as
aversive (and coded as losses) and receipts as desirable (and
coded as gains), we asked them to indicate on a seven-point
scale how they thought of the money received (price paid)
for the old camera (new camera) (1 = “I think of these
receipts [price] as a gain,” and 7 = “I think of these pay-
ments [price] as a loss”). The results confirm that respon-
dents coded the trade-in receipt as a gain and the price paid
for the new model as a loss (2.55 < 5.23; t(30) = 6.83, p <
.001).
These results not only confirm our original premise
regarding the coding of monetary payments as losses and
receipts as gains but also rule out the possibility that low
statistical power limited our ability to detect an effect for the
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5If participants code trade-in values as losses relative to the original price
paid (the relevant reference point) and new model prices as gains relative
to the prevailing market price, when the trade-in value is low, the experi-
enced loss is large, but so is the experienced gain. Conversely, when the
trade-in value is high, the experienced loss is small, but so is the gain.
Because the slope of the value function is steeper close to the origin, and
because of loss aversion, the net impact of a small loss and small gain
(–$20, +$30) is likely to be more aversive than the net impact of a large
loss and a commensurately large gain (–$60, +$70). Therefore, if partici-
pants code trade-in receipts as losses and the new model’s price as a gain,
they should prefer the underpayment format (which yields [–$60, +$70])
because it is less aversive than the overpayment format. If we observe a
main effect caused by the provision of this additional reference price infor-
mation, it would imply that, contrary to our model’s assumptions, partici-
pants code trade-in receipts as losses and new model prices as gains.
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rival, attention-based explanation.6 Our sample size was
sufficiently large enough to detect the effect of loss/gain
coding; thus, we cannot attribute the absence of an effect for
the relative attention hypothesis to lack of power.
Having established support for our foundational predic-
tion, we now turn to Study 2, in which we examine two
methodological nuances. Specifically, we assess whether
our results are (1) sensitive to the requirement that outcomes
are additively separable and (2) not sensitive to the numeri-
cal values we elected to manipulate.
STUDY 2
A central premise underlying our prediction is that peo-
ple code each element of the transaction separately. In par-
ticular, if the trade-in model’s price and the new model’s
price are combined into one outcome, when faced with eco-
nomically equivalent outcomes, people should be indiffer-
ent between stores that underpay versus stores that overpay.
The predicted preference reversal should only be observed
when people separate the two outcomes. We designed this
study to address this issue.
The study employed a 2 ¥ 2 between-subjects experimen-
tal design. One factor manipulated whether the transactions
were framed as separate or combined, and the other factor
manipulated the magnitude of the ratio between the trade-in
model’s price and the new model’s price (low versus high).
Student participants evaluated the attractiveness of purchase
of a digital camera from two fictitious stores.
Design
We manipulated whether participants’ focus on the two
transactions should be viewed as separate or combined by
employing a priming task. Before being exposed to the
stimulus regarding camera prices and store selection, par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to one of the two framing
conditions and asked to evaluate Consumer Reports tips for
people planning to buy a new car. Participants in the sepa-
rate condition evaluated the following:
Negotiate one thing at one time.
You’ll get the best deal by keeping the purchase and
trade-in negotiations separate. If you allow salespeople
to mix the two, it gives them too much of an opportu-
nity to manipulate the deals so that a good price in one
area could be canceled out by a poor price in the other.
We suggest that you nail down the price of the car you
want to purchase first, then discuss your trade-in
allowance. Always evaluate the price of a new car and
trade-in allowance separately.
Participants in the combined condition evaluated the following:
Negotiate many things at the same time.
You’ll get the best deal by combining the purchase and
trade-in negotiations. If you allow salespeople to keep
the two separate, it gives them too much of an opportu-
nity to manipulate the deals so that a good price in one
area could be canceled out by a poor price in the other.
We suggest that you simultaneously nail down both the
price of the car you want to purchase and the trade-in
allowance. Always evaluate the price of a new car and
trade-in allowance together.
After evaluating these primes, participants evaluated two
transactions for a camera purchase, as in Study 1.
A second methodological nuance involved varying the
price of the new model to achieve the low- versus high-ratio
manipulation. As in Study 1, we created four price combi-
nations for the stimulus product (cameras). In the first, in
which the ratio of the used model’s price to the new model’s
price was low, we priced the trade-in model at $40 and the
new model at $250; in the second price combination, we
priced the trade-in model at $80 and the new model at $290.
In the third price combination, in which the ratio of the used
model’s price to the new model’s price was high, we priced
the trade-in model at $40 and the new model at $50; in the
last price combination, we priced the trade-in model at $80
and the new model at $90. Note that we produced the high
ratio by keeping the price of the trade-in model low while
lowering the price of the new model, unlike in Study 1.
Participants and Stimuli
Ninety-four undergraduate students (approximately 60%
female) from two U.S. universities participated in the study.
We used a digital camera as a stimulus. We randomly
assigned participants to one of the four experimental cells
and gave them stimuli associated with each cell.
Participants first read and evaluated Consumer Reports
tips, which served to manipulate separation of the two com-
ponents of the transaction. Next, they read a scenario about
the trade-in transaction offered by two fictitious stores:
“Calypso,” which underpaid on the trade-in and charged a
commensurately low price on the new model, and “Advan-
tage,” which overpaid on the trade-in and charged a com-
mensurately high price on the new model. In addition, we
measured perceptions of the attractiveness of the offers and
the stores employing seven-point scales (1 = “Calypso is
much better than Advantage/I would prefer to shop at
Calypso,” and 7 = “Advantage is much better than Calypso/
I would prefer to shop at Advantage”). Then, to check the
success of the separation versus combined manipulation, we
asked participants to rate their perception of the transaction
(1 = “The two dollar amounts were separate,” and 7 = “The
two dollar amounts were combined”). The key dependent
variable of interest was a discrete choice item that prompted
participants to indicate which store they would patronize,
assuming they wanted to engage in the transaction. Partici-
pants could indicate Calypso, Advantage, or indifference.
After participants completed the questionnaires, we thanked,
debriefed, and dismissed them.
Results
Participants in the separate prime condition indicated that
they considered the dollar amounts associated with the two
transactions separate to a greater degree than participants in
the combined prime condition (5.19 > 5.87; one-tailed t(93) =
1.84, p < .05). We deemed our manipulation of the frame
(separate versus combined) successful.
Our principal dependent variable of interest is store
choice. We ran a fully saturated logit model on store choice
as a function of frame (A), ratio (B), and their interaction (A ¥
B) on the participants who displayed a store preference. As
6In this study, we rely on participants’ coding monetary payments as
losses. In Study 3, we manipulate participants’ loss aversion and test
whether they behave in a manner consistent with the predictions of our
model.
expected, we observed a significant interaction (b = 3.75, p <
.05). Consistent with our prediction, when we primed par-
ticipants to treat the transactions as separate, the preference
for overpayment on the trade-in model in the low-ratio con-
dition was substantial (78.6%), while the preference for
underpayment was large in the high-ratio condition
(87.5%). A test of proportions indicated that this difference
was statistically significant (p < .05). Conversely, when we
primed participants to consider the transactions in combina-
tion, the preference for overpayment in the two conditions
(33.3% and 45.6%, respectively) was not statistically differ-
ent (p > .10).
The results from the analysis of the attractiveness of the
store and of the offers were consistent with the results from
the discrete choice analysis. Offer attractiveness displayed a
significant two-way interaction between frame (separate
versus combined) and ratio (low versus high) (p < .0001)
that was driven by a preference reversal. In the separate con-
dition, low ratios yielded a preference for overpayment
compared with high ratios (4.68 versus 3.29; one-tailed
t(90) = 4.58, p < .001), while in the combined condition, we
observed the opposite effect (3.56 versus 4.16; one-tailed
t(90) = 1.79, p < .05). Store attractiveness displayed a mar-
ginal interaction effect (p < .08), driven by a simple effect
for overpayment under low ratios in the separate condition
(4.58 versus 3.24; one-tailed t(90) = 4.46, p < .001), and no
effect under the combined condition (3.81 versus 3.68, p >
.35). These results make sense because the magnitude of the
effect should be stronger when evaluating the offer than
when evaluating the store overall.
Discussion
In summary, the results of this study replicated Study 1
and our foundational prediction, according to which the
preference for under- and overpayment is a function of the
ratio of the price of the used model to that of the new model
only when people treat the two transactions as separate.
These results are evident from the analysis of the discrete
choice data and the more powerful analysis of the scalar
dependent variables. In addition, we eliminated the possi-
bility that our results were an artifact of the particular
numerical combination employed, because the high-ratio
condition in this study comprised relatively low prices for
the used model. In other words, it is less likely that the sheer
numerical magnitude of the transaction in the high-ratio
condition makes the price more salient, leading to enhanced
loss aversion for the larger purchase, which in turn results
in a preference for underpayment.
The finding that our results hinge on whether elements of
the transaction are coded separately is an important finding
that speaks to the generalizability of our model. If con-
sumers do not spontaneously separate elements of the trans-
action as we have postulated, our results would not be
observed. In other words, the external validity of our results
is crucially dependent on the degree to which consumers
parse trade-in transaction prices, a topic to which we return
in the “Discussion” section. We now turn to our final study,
in which we assess support for a prediction derived from our
model (Corollary 3), according to which the preference
reversal phenomenon that H1 predicts should be more pro-
nounced when the loss aversion coefficient is high.
STUDY 3
Our goal in Study 3 is to assess whether participants who
differ in the degree to which they are naturally loss averse
display the predicted preference reversal to differing
degrees. This is a theoretically defensible boundary condi-
tion because, if loss aversion is one underlying driver of the
effect, to the extent that people are less loss averse, the
effect should be attenuated.
Previous research has identified many possible bases for
individual differences in loss aversion. For example, accord-
ing to one research stream (Wang 1996), loss aversion
varies by cultural context. Another recent research stream
examines a person’s “regulatory focus” as the basis for dif-
ferences in loss aversion. In light of its wide applicability in
the consumer behavior literature in marketing (e.g., Zhu and
Meyers-Levy 2007), we examine whether and how a per-
son’s regulatory focus affects their loss aversion and, thus,
the tendency to prefer over- rather than underpayments in
trade-in transactions.
Regulatory Focus Theory
Research on regulatory focus theory suggests that people
differ in their self-regulation system, distinguishing between
promotion and prevention focuses (Higgins 1997; Shah and
Higgins 2001). People who are promotion oriented are con-
cerned with maximizing positive outcomes, and people who
are prevention oriented are concerned with minimizing nega-
tive outcomes. These orientations regulate their preferences
and behaviors in many ways. Most pertinent to our research
is the finding that people who are promotion oriented are
particularly sensitive to potential gains, while people who
are prevention oriented are particularly sensitive to potential
losses, resulting in different loss aversion patterns between
the two types (Chernev 2004). That is, because prevention-
oriented consumers are concerned with minimizing losses
while promotion-oriented consumers are concerned with
maximizing gains, loss aversion is likely to be greater for
consumers who are prevention oriented than for those who
are promotion oriented. Furthermore, such differences sug-
gest that the degree of preference reversal offered in H1
should differ between promotion- and prevention-focused
consumers. Specifically, because prevention-oriented people
are relatively more loss sensitive in general, their preference
for underpayment rather than overpayment should be greater
than any such preference differences exhibited by promotion-
oriented people. However, recall that diminishing sensitivity
also plays a role in whether consumers prefer underpayment;
in the high-ratio condition, the effect of loss aversion should
dominate the effect of diminishing sensitivity, and in the low-
ratio condition, the effect of diminishing sensitivity should
be the dominant force. Consequently, prevention-oriented
consumers’ preference for underpayment should be most
readily apparent in the high-ratio condition. We conducted a
study to assess whether these preferences would be
observed.
Participants and Design
Because Studies 1 and 2 established that the predictions
of our model are observed only when prices are encoded
separately, we primed all participants in this study to
process the prices separately using the prime described in
Study 2. To manipulate the person’s regulatory focus (pro-
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motion versus prevention), we employed a procedure that
prior research (e.g., Higgins 1997) has successfully used.
Participants were first asked to write down either their goals
and hopes (promotion condition) or their duties and obliga-
tions (prevention condition), in an attempt to prime one or
the other regulatory focus.
One hundred eighty-eight undergraduate students in a
large university participated in the study. After their regula-
tory focus had been primed through the writing exercise,
they were exposed to economically equivalent over- and
underpayment formats. This procedure yielded a 2 (regula-
tory focus: promotion-oriented versus prevention-oriented) ¥
2 (ratio of trade-in price to new model’s price: low versus
high) between-subjects factorial design.
Other than the regulatory focus inducing writing task, the
stimulus material was similar to that used in Study 1. We
asked participants to report their preferences for two stores
selling cameras using different trade-in and new model
prices on a seven-point scale, in which lower values
reflected a preference for underpayment. After participants
completed the survey, we thanked, debriefed, and dismissed
them.
Results
The results of the study yielded a pattern that was broadly
consistent with our theorizing. We observed a main 
effect for promotion versus prevention (Mpromotion = 4.53 >
Mprevention = 3.96; F(1, 184) = 9.10, p < .005). Contrast
analyses indicate that the simple effect of price ratio on store
preference was significant for promotion-oriented partici-
pants (Mlow-ratio_promotion = 4.95 versus Mhigh-ratio promotion =
4.16; F(1, 184) = 9.74, p < .005). Furthermore, regardless of
ratio condition, participants always preferred overpayment
(the means are greater than 4.0), and the pattern of the
means was consistent with Corollary 1 because participants
preferred overpayment more when the ratio of prices was
low (condition in which the effect of diminishing sensitivity
was relatively large). Finally, the simple effect of price 
ratio on store preference was significant for prevention-
oriented participants as well (Mlow-ratio_prevention = 4.52 ver-
sus Mhigh-ratio_prevention = 3.49; F(1, 184) = 15.95, p < .001),
and the means indicate that, consistent with Corollary 2,
such prevention-oriented participants prefer underpayment
in the high-ratio condition because the effect of loss aver-
sion dominates the effect of diminishing sensitivity, whereas
they prefer overpayment in the low-ratio condition. In other
words, for prevention-oriented participants alone, we observed
a preference reversal, consistent with our theorizing.
In summary, the results of Study 3 provide a boundary
condition for the preference reversal that is consistent with
our model. When loss aversion is not substantial (because
of a promotion- rather than prevention-orientation), the
preference reversal we observe is less likely to manifest.
DISCUSSION
Summary
We develop a model and conduct experiments that
demonstrate a reversal in preference for pricing formats in
trade-in transactions, depending on the ratio of the price of
the used model to that of the new model. When we sepa-
rated elements of the transaction, participants displayed a
systematic preference for being overpaid on their used
model when the ratio of the prices was low, and this prefer-
ence was reversed when the ratio of prices was high, a find-
ing consistent with our model, which we derived from the
prospect theory value function.
Implications
Theoretically, and consistent with other recent research,
we demonstrate that consumers are not indifferent between
economically equivalent pricing formats when evaluating
trade-in transactions. Although we observe support for a
preference for overpayment, as Zhu, Chen, and Dasgupta
(2008) and Purohit (1995) demonstrate, we predict and
observe a theoretically defensible reversal of this preference
caused by loss aversion and marginal sensitivity. Our sim-
ple model, which is based on prospect theory’s value func-
tion, allows for the development of relatively precise pre-
dictions and provides a parsimonious explanation for the
observed preferences. Specifically, the model enables us to
specify the levels of the independent variable (see footnote
4) and to generate predictions regarding the role of preven-
tion and promotion (using the corollaries). A less formal,
verbal theory would likely not have yielded the same level
of precision and parsimony.
In addition, our findings are of considerable practical sig-
nificance. Vendors of durable products ranging from auto-
mobiles and skis to computers and golf clubs face the task
of persuading consumers to purchase new models while
there still is considerable value in the consumer’s existing
model. We recognize that the general problem of persuad-
ing consumers to trade in used models is an independent
(and significant) issue (Okada 2001); however, our question
revolves around the framing of the prices associated with
the transaction after the consumer has made the decision to
engage in a trade. In other words, our emphasis is on the
framing of price information and not on the framing of
product information, which we take to be fixed. For prod-
ucts such as late-model automobiles, for which, in general,
the ratio of the price of the old to the new version is high,
vendors would be well advised to select the underpayment
format. Conversely, for products such as cell phones, for
which, in general, the ratio of the price of the old to the new
version is low, vendors would be well advised to select the
overpayment format. However, an important caveat is in
order with regard to the generalizability of our results: Our
results are crucially dependent on consumers’ sponta-
neously separating the price elements of the trade-in trans-
action or being forced to separate these price components
by the manner in which the information is presented. In the
absence of separability, our results would not be observed.
Limitations and Further Research
First, our model and experimental settings only account
for circumstances in which the price of the old model is less
than that of the new model. However, the new model is
occasionally cheaper than the old model. Our model is read-
ily applicable to this case, but empirical validation of such a
case is a topic left to further research.
Second, our model only holds when trade-in receipts are
coded as gains (and not losses) and the new model’s price is
coded as a loss (and not a gain). If situations exist in which
the trade-in receipt is coded as a loss (e.g., because a con-
sumer’s internal reference price is relatively high) or the
new model’s price is coded as a gain (e.g., because the con-
sumer’s reference price is relatively high), the results of the
model will likely not hold. In addition, it is essential for our
model that payments be aversive. One procedure to test
whether this coding scheme can be interfered with and thus
change our results would be to provide credible and salient
stimulus-based reference price information. Then, a high
reference price for the trade-in model and/or a very high ref-
erence price for the new model might yield different results.
The third conceptual issue is the source of loss aversion.
The issue of why people tend to be loss averse has attracted
much discussion and debate in the behavioral decision
theory literature. Some scholars have argued for an evolu-
tionary basis for loss aversion (Wang 1996), and others have
suggested that the observed effects are due to experimental
artifacts (Cosmides and Tooby 1996). We are agnostic on
this issue, though we observe a nexus between loss aversion
and the negativity bias literature (Ahluwalia 2002). For our
model to work, it is only necessary for loss aversion to exist.
This research demonstrates that consumers treat econom-
ically equivalent prices differently in trade-in transactions.
A question that emerges from our research is whether firms
can earn higher effective profits by carefully combining the
price of the new model and trade-in allowance for the used
model. Formal models that involve an extension of our sim-
ple model could examine questions about firm strategy
under monopoly and under competition in light of this con-
sumer bias.
In addition, we view the two transactions as simultaneous
rather than sequential. However, it is possible that if the first
transaction is the purchase and the second transaction is the
trade-in sale, the consumer’s reference price will shift
because of the first transaction, and this reference price shift
will have implications for the second transaction (Chen and
Rao 2002). Similarly, if the trade-in transaction is first and
the purchase of the new model is second, again, the refer-
ence price may shift. We do not consider these dynamics in
our model.
Finally, we present study participants with economically
equivalent options in a within-subjects design. The behav-
ioral literature suggests that when consumers are confronted
with choices that are equally (un)attractive, but for different
reasons, they experience trade-off aversion (Hedgcock and
Rao 2009). Such trade-off aversion has been studied using
cognitive neuroscientific methods, and perhaps trade-in
evaluations that involve implicit trade-offs (gains and
losses) could be studied similarly, while employing
between-subjects designs.
In summary, we demonstrate that consumers prefer to be
overpaid on their used trade-in model only when the ratio of
the price between the trade-in model and the new model is
low. When this ratio is high, consumers may prefer to be
underpaid on their trade-in model, a finding that is rife with
theoretical and practical implications.
APPENDIX A: DETAILS OF THE PROOFS
Details of the Proof of Proposition 1
arg
d
max{[na – l(m)a][(l)(pn + d)a – (pu + d)a]}.
Because the quality parameters are exogenous to the model,
we can write the preceding as follows:
(A1) arg
d
max(–l)(pn + d)a – (pu + d)a.
The first-order condition yields 
(A2) la(pn + d)a– 1 = a(kpn + d)a– 1.
Rearranging the terms in Equation A2 yields
(kpn + d)a– 1/(pn + d)a– 1 = l.
This implies the following:
(A3) (kpn + d)/(pn + d) = l/a– 1.
Note that Q ∫ l/a– 1; therefore, Equation A3 can be rewrit-
ten as follows:
(A4) (kpn + d)/(pn + d) = Q.
Solving Equation A4 for d yields
(A5) d* = [(Q – k)/(1 – Q)]pn.
To check for the second-order condition, we followed this
process: The second derivative of Equation A1 with respect
to d is
(A6) –laa– 1)(pn + d)a– aa– 1)(kpn + d)a– .
Inserting Equation A5 in Equation A6 to find the optimal-
ity condition for d yields
–laa– 1){pn + [(Q – k)/(1 – Q)]pn}a– 
aa– 1){kpn + [(Q – k)/(1 – Q)]pn}a– .
Taking pn out of the parentheses from the preceding equa-
tion produces the following:
–laa– 1){1 + [(Q – k)/(1 – Q)]}a– pn)a– 
aa– 1){k + [(Q – k)/(1 – Q)]}a– pn)a– .
On further simplification, this yields
–laa– 1){[(1 – k)/(1 – Q)]}a– pn)a– 
aa– 1){[(Q – Qk)/(1 – Q)]}a– pn)a– .
=>
–aa– 1){lpn)a– [(1 – k)/(1 – Q)]a– 
– pn)a– [(1 – k)/(1 – Q)]a– Q)a– }.
Pulling out all the common terms:
–aa– 1)pn)a– [(1 – k)/(1 – Q)]a– [l– Q)a– ].
Recall that Q ∫ l/a– 1. Note that the terms outside the final
brackets are all positive because a < 1, k < 1, and Q < 1.
Next, substitute for Q in the preceding expression only
within the final brackets:
a1 – a)pn)a– [(1 – k)/(1 – Q)]a– [l– l/a– 1)a– ].
That equals
(A7) a1 – a)pn)a– [(1 – k)/(1 – Q)]a– [l– la– /a– 1)].
Note that the expression inside the parentheses is negative,
because (a – /a – ) > 1, and this implies la – /a –  > l
because l > 1. So [l – (la – /a – ] < 0, and therefore Equa-
tion A7 is negative. So at the optimal d, obtained from the
first-order condition, we obtain a negative second-order con-
dition, and thus the original expression must be a maxima.
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Proof of Corollary 1
With no loss aversion, l = , so the consumer’s valuation
for the pricing format is
–(pn + d)a + (pu + d)a.
The first derivative of the preceding expression with respect
to d is
–a(pn + d)a – 1 + a(kpn + d)a – 1,
or equivalently
This expression is always positive because (kpn + d) < (pn +
d). In other words, as d increases, the subjective value
increases; therefore, consumers would prefer a larger d to a
smaller d and overpayment on the trade-in allowance to an
underpayment on the trade-in allowance.
Proof of Corollary 2
With no diminishing sensitivity, the a term has a value
of 1. Consider the following inequality, which captures the
argument that underpayment is preferred: For every d+ > 0,
(A8) (l)(pn + d+) + (pu + d+) < –(l)(pn – d+) + (pu – d+).
This implies that
–lpn – ld+ + pu + d+ < –lpn + ld+ + pu – d+.
After canceling the common terms, we have
–ld+ + d+ < +d+ – d+ Æ 2d+ < 2ld+.
Because d+ > 0, this implies that l > 1, which is true by
definition. Therefore Equation A8 must be true.
Proof of Corollary 3
Recall that Q ∫ l/a– 1.
because a < 1 and l > 1. Therefore, as l increases, Q
declines.
Now, recall from P1 that
From this expression, it follows that a decline in Q leads to
a decline in the cutoff value of k that generates the reversal,
indicating that an increase in l generates preference rever-
sals at a lower value of k.
If the used item is valued higher than the new item (k >
1), the optimal deviation from benchmark level, d*, is nega-
tive. In other words, when consumers “trade down,” they
prefer to be underpaid on the trade-in allowance.
Proof: Recall that the optimal deviation from the bench-
mark is given by the following (from Equation A5):
This is always negative for k > 1 because Q < 1.
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APPENDIX B: PROOFS USING A NONPARAMETRIC
FORM OF THE VALUE FUNCTION
P1: For k < q, consumers prefer a pricing format that yields d >
0, whereas for k ≥ q, consumers prefer a pricing format that
yields d £ 0. In other words, as the ratio of the price of the
trade-in model to the price of the new model increases, there
is a preference reversal from desiring an overpayment to
desiring an underpayment.
Proof: The reference dependent value function is given
by the following:
Using Equation A1, we can write the total value of a joint
transaction that involves an allowance d as follows:
(B2) u(d, pn) = –lg(pn + d) + g(kpn + d).
We complete the proof in the four steps detailed next.
Step 1: Calculating the Optimal Allowance
Consumers’ most preferred pricing format for a given
price is as follows:
arg
d
max –lg(pn + d) + g(kpn + d).
We obtain the optimal allowance dk from the solution of the
following first-order condition:
–lg¢(pn + dk) + g¢kpn + dk
or
We assume that the function g is well behaved in the sense
that an interior solution exists. This holds as long as we
assume that the following second-order condition is satisfied:
(B4) –lg¢¢(pn + dk) + g¢¢kpn + dk
Step 2: Showing That the Optimal Allowance Is Positive
Around the Lower Bound of k and Negative Around the
Upper Bound of k
Next, we show that the optimal allowance is positive
around the lower bound of k and negative around the upper
bound of k. Note that k Œ (0, 1), which means that the price
of the used model being traded in is strictly less than the
new model.
Part a: Let the optimal allowance be dk0 when k0pn =  >
0, where k = k0 is very close to zero. We want to show that
dk0 > 0. We show this by contradiction. Let us suppose that
the optimal allowance is an underallowance given by (–k+),
where k+ > 0. Because –k+ is optimal, it necessarily implies
that
–lg(pn – k+) + g(kpn – k+) > –lg(pn + k+) +g(kpn + k+)
or
–lg(pn – k+) + g( – k+) > –lg(pn + k+) + g( + k+).
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This implies that
Note that l has a finite upper bound (in most empirical
work, the value is close to 2). In contrast, as k+ gets closer
to zero, the denominator of Equation B5 approaches 0 (note
that because of diminishing sensitivity, the numerator would
always exceed the denominator), and as  the left-hand side
becomes larger, there must be * such that for  < *, Equa-
tion B4 is no longer satisfied. Thus, for k0 very close to
zero, Equation B4 will be violated, and this implies that the
optimal allowance must be an overallowance. In other
words, dk0 must be positive.
Part b: Let the optimal allowance when k = k1, where 
k1 is very close to 1, be given bydk1. Let k1pn be equal to 
pn – 1, where 1 > 0 is close to zero. Equation B3 yields the
following:
Now if the dk1 > 0, as 1Æ 0, the expression in Equation B6
would approach 1 and can no longer be satisfied. Suppose
we take dk1 = –pn + 2, where 2 > 1 and both 1 and 2 are
in the vicinity of zero. Then, we can rewrite Equation B6 as
Note that in Equation B7, we can always pick an appropri-
ate 2 for a given 1 so that the optimality condition is met.
Thus, in the preceding equation, we show that when k is
close to its lower bound 0, the optimal allowance is an over-
payment, and when k is close to its upper bound 1, the opti-
mal allowance is an underpayment.
Step 3: Showing That the Optimal Allowance Is a
Decreasing Function of k
Note that at a given k, the optimal allowance dk is given
by the following:
Using envelope theorem, we have
Note that the numerator is positive because g¢¢ < 0 (due to
diminishing sensitivity) and the denominator is negative due
to Equation B3. Thus, for k Œ (0, 1), we have the following:
(B9) ∂dk/∂k < 0.
In other words, as k increases, the optimal allowance
decreases.
Step 4
There is a k = q such that for k Œ (0, q), dk ≥ 0 and for k Œ
(q, 1), dk < 0. Furthermore, this value of q is unique and is
given by the following implicit equation:
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Note that in Step 2 of the proof, we show that when k is
close to zero, the optimal allowance given by Equation B3
is greater than zero, while for values of k close to 1, the
optimal allowance is less than zero. It is immediately
implied by the intermediate value theorem that there must
be a k denoted by q where the optimal allowance is zero.
This value of q is obtained by substituting dk = 0 in Equa-
tion B3, which yields the following:
Uniqueness is shown by contradiction. Suppose that there is
another k = (k* + ) where  > 0 such that
Denominators in both Equations B10 and B11 are the same
and because g¢ > 0, g¢¢ < 0, which means that g¢[(q + )pn] <
g¢(k*pn). However, this implies that Equation B10 can never
be true. The proof for  < 0 follows similarly.
Corollary 1: When consumers exhibit only diminishing sensi-
tivity and no loss aversion, they always prefer an
overpaid trade-in allowance.
Proof: Note that when l = 1,
The first derivative of the preceding equation with respect
to d gives
Diminishing sensitivity ensures that the preceding expres-
sion is strictly positive, and thus the higher the value of d,
the higher is the value of Equation B12. Therefore, con-
sumers always prefer overpayment.
Corollary 2: When consumers exhibit only loss aversion and no
diminishing sensitivity, they always prefer an
underpaid trade-in allowance. 
This is true if, for every+ > 0, we have
or
If diminishing sensitivity is not present, then
This immediately implies that l > 1. This is true, by 
definition.
Corollary 3: Preference reversal increases in l. In other words,
the larger the loss aversion coefficient, consumers’
preference for underpayment in trade-in allowance
is observed for a larger range of k.
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Proof: We show the change in k* with respect to l by
applying envelope theorem to Equation B10, which yields
It immediately follows from Equation B1 that this is nega-
tive. Therefore, for stronger loss aversion, the cutoff q is
smaller, which implies that the preference reversal occurs
earlier.
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